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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to review the district court's final judgment 
under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(g). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the district court err by dismissing Mr. Harmon's rule 65B petition 
for failure to state any claims upon which relief could be granted? 
Preservation: The Appellee raised this issue in its motion to dismiss. 
Record (R.) 117-31. 
Standard of review: The Court reviews a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) 
for correctness. Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11, ,r 14, 203 P.3d 962. 
DETERMATIVE PROVISIONS 
Any determinative provisions are provided in the text of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: Mr. Harmon challenges the Board of Pardons and 
Parole's decision in 2008 refusing to grant him parole from his life sentence 
for murder. 
Proceedings below: Several years after the Board decision, Mr. 
Harmon filed a petition for extraordinary relief in district court. Record (R.) 
1-7. The Board moved to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); 
Mr. Harmon filed a response to which the Board replied. R. 117-132, 178-
184, R. 187-93. 
I 
Disposition: The trial court granted the Board's motion to dismiss 
because prior controlling decisions bar any claim upon which relief can be 
granted. R. 202-07. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1995, Mr. Harmon shot two men; one died and the other was 
injured. See State v. Harmon, 956 P .2d 262, 264 (Utah 1998). A jury later 
found Mr. Harmon guilty of murder, a first degree felony, and attempted 
murder, a second degree felony. R. 134-38. In September, 1996, the district 
court sentenced Mr. Harmon to prison for indeterminate terms of five years 
to life for the Murder conviction, and one to fifteen years for the Attempted 
Murder conviction. R. 136-37. These sentences were to run concurrently. R. 
136. 1 
Two months later, the Board of Pardons and Parole ("Board") scheduled 
an Original Hearing for Mr. Harmon to take place in September 2008. R. 
140. In the meantime, he completed multiple training and rehabilitation 
programs and held various jobs while incarcerated. R. 31-42, 49-61, 65, 72, 
147. He also unsuccessfully requested an earlier parole hearing and parole 
date. R. 145-47. 
1 Mr. Harmon also received two one-year sentencing enhancements because 
both crimes were committed with a firea·rm. R. 136. The sentencing 
enhancements were to run consecutively to the other sentences. R. 136. 
2 
;) 
On September 2, 2008, Mr. Harmon appeared personally before the 
Board for his Original Hearing. Beforehand, he received his "blue packet" 
containing all of the records and materials the Board would rely upon when 
making its decision. R. 2-3. After reviewing the packet and conducting the 
Original Hearing, the Board determined Mr. Harmon would not receive a 
parole date but instead would expire his life sentence in prison. R. 150. The 
Board's decision meant Mr. Harmon would serve the maximum amount of 
time-life-to which he was sentenced for his crimes. R. 2, 136. 
The Board also issued a Rationale for Decision sheet that specified 
aggravating and mitigating factors upon which the Board based its decision. 
R. 151. The Board found relevant the following aggravating factors: 
"Multiple incidents and/or victims," "Extent of the injury (physical, 
emotional, financial, social)," "Relatively vulnerable victim vs. aggressive or 
provoking victim," and "Denial or minimization vs. complete acceptance of 
responsibility." R. 151 (emphasis in original). By underlying "minimization," 
the Board appears to have put special emphasis on that factor. R. 151. On 
the other hand, the Board found relevant the following mitigating factors: 
"Programming (effort to enroll, nature of programing)," and "Disciplinary 
problems or other defiance of authority." R. 151. The Board left other 
potentially relevant aggravating and mitigating factors unchecked, including 
3 
"Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities," and "[Lack of] [p]ersonal 
gain reaped from the offense." R. 151. 
In 2015, Mr. Harmon filed a rule 65B petition for extraordinary relief 
in district court claiming the Board's 2008 decision violated fundamental 
fairness, due process, cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and 
that Utah's sentencing scheme was unconstitutional. R. 5-6. The Board 
moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state any claims upon which relief 
could be granted. R. 119-32. In essence, the Board argued that Mr. Harmon 
had failed to allege any facts supporting his claims or the facts he did allege 
failed to state viable claims as a matter of law. Id. The trial court agreed 
and dismissed the petition under rule 12(b)(6). R. 202-07. Mr. Harmon 
timely filed this appeal. R. 219. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal when, as a matter of law, a 
complaint fails to state any claims upon which relief may be granted. The 
district court correctly applied that standard to Mr. Harmon's petition and 
dismissed his claims. 
Mr. Harmon first argues that the Board's rationale sheet did not 
adequately advise him of the Board's reasoning. But the Supreme Court has 
already held that the Board's rationale sheets are adequate. At most, Mr. 
4 
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Harmon's arguments about the factors the Board did or did not consider go to 
the substance of the Board's decision, which the Court cannot review. 
Similarly, Mr. Harmon argues that the Board should have advised him 
of his ability to hire counsel for his parole hearing. But he has no 
constitutional right to counsel at a parole hearing, nor has he identified any 
authority requiring the Board to advise him of his ability to hire his own 
attorney. Case law suggests no such right exists. 
Finally, Mr. Harmon argues without much analysis that the Board's 
decision was arbitrary or capricious. But case law squarely holds that absent 
unusual circumstances, a Board's parole determination is not arbitrary or 
capricious as long as it falls within the indeterminate sentence imposed by 
the district court. Here, the Board decided simply that Mr. Harmon would 
serve the full amount of his life sentence. To the extent he argues that his 
good behavior in prison constitutes "unusual circumstances," that argument 
has also already been rejected by Utah courts. 
In short, Mr. Harmon's claims and supporting allegations fail to state 
claims upon which relief could be granted as a matter of settled precedent. 
The district court therefore appropriately dismissed the petition. 
5 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The propriety of a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) presents a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. Helf, 2009 UT 11, iJ 14. The Court must 
"accept the material allegations in the [petition] as true and interpret those 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff as the non-moving party." Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic 
Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, iJ 8, 175 P.3d 1042. But the Court need not 
countenance mere legal conclusions or conclusory fact allegations 
unsupported by recitation of any relevant supporting facts. Commonwealth 
Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 UT App 
232, iJ 16, 263 P.3d 397. 
The Board's decisions are generally not subject to judicial review. Utah 
Code § 77-27-5(3). However, courts may use an extraordinary writ to review 
the Board's decisions in two narrow circumstances; to correct "a gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion," Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 
677, 683 (Utah 1995), and to assure that procedural due process was not 
denied, Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909-13 (Utah 
1993). 
Importantly, judicial review of Board decisions considers only "the 
fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing 
function," not the result. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 94 7 P .2d 
6 
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664, 667 (Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board has 
exclusive authority to determine the actual number of years a defendant 
serves within his sentence, Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994), 
and the court does not "sit as a panel of review on the result, absent some 
other constitutional claim." Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P .2d 945, 
947 (Utah 1994). 
ARGUMENT 
The district court properly dismissed Mr. Harmon's petition for failure 
to state a claim. The court used the correct rule 12(b)(6) analysis to dismiss 
the claims. As a matter of settled precedent, Mr. Harmon's allegations about 
the rationale sheet, an alleged right to be advised to seek his own counsel, 
and fundamental fairness, do not state a claim upon which his requested 
relief-reversal of the Board's decision-could be granted. 
I. The District Court Applied The Right Standard Under Rule 
12(B)(6) And Properly Dismissed The Petition. 
Mr. Harmon first argues generally that the petition alleges enough 
facts to survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion, but the district court "ignored the 
facts." Aplt. Br. at 10.2 But he doesn't specify which facts were allegedly 
2 Mr. Harmon also argues that his claims need only be "plausible" under 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) to survive dismissal. Aplt. Br. at 9. 
But Utah hasn't adopted the "heightened plausibility standard for pleadings" 
required under the federal procedure rules. See, e.g., Am. W. Bank Member, 
L.C. v. State, 2014 UT 49, ,r 13 n.22, 342 P.3d 224. At any rate, because Mr. 
7 
ignored nor how those facts state a viable claim undermining the Board's 
decision. He has therefore failed to show any district court error on this 
point. Nor can he foist his burden of persuasion onto the Court or the Board 
to review the petition looking for any redressable allegations that he did not 
raise himself. 
Moreover, it is readily apparent that the district court correctly 
dismissed Mr. Harmon's petition because settled law precludes any relief 
based on the few facts alleged in Mr. Harmon's petition. When considering a 
12(b)(6) motion, the court's "inquiry is concerned solely with the sufficiency of 
the pleadings, and not the underlying merits of the case." State v. Apotex 
Corp., 2012 UT 36, il 42, 282 P.3d 66. Thus, dismissal is appropriate when it 
is "apparent that as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the 
facts alleged." Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P .2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
As indicated below, the district court properly concluded that Mr. Harmon 
could not recover under the facts alleged in his petition. 
II. The District Court Properly Rejected Mr. Harmon's Due 
Process Claims. 
The petition shows the Board provided Mr. Harmon the requisite 
procedural due process under Utah law. As a general matter, "[t]he Board 
must satisfy two due process requirements in conducting parole hearings. 
Harmon's petition does not satisfy Utah's traditional rule 12(b)(6) standards, 
the petition could not satisfy the heightened plausibility standard. 
8 
First, 'an inmate must receive adequate notice to prepare for a parole 
hearing.' Second, the inmate must 'receive copies or a summary of the 
information in the Board's file upon which the Board will rely."' Stewart u. 
Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2015 UT App 246, iJ 6, 360 P.3d 800 (quoting 
Peterson u. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 931 P.2d 147 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). The 
Board is not required to provide inmates any additional information or 
procedures. Peterson, 931 P.2d at 150. 
Here, the Petition states that Mr. Harmon was incarcerated in 1996 
and received an Original Hearing before the Board on September 2, 2008. R. 
2-3. The Petition also states that "Mr. Harmon was provided a 'blue packet"' 
which was "the information contained in the Board's file on an inmate of 
which the Board intends to rely during its decision-making process." R. 4. 
Mr. Harmon's petition did not allege the ''blue packet" was lacking 
information or that the Board considered information outside of the packet 
materials, nor did the Petition allege Mr. Harmon failed to receive adequate 
notice to prepare for the Board hearing. Thus, under Utah law, Mr. Harmon 
has not alleged facts showing violation of procedural due process in the Board 
hearing. 
A. The Board's rationale sheet is constitutionally adequate. 
Mr. Harmon asserts the Board failed to provide him a constitutionally 
adequate rationale for its decision. Aplt's Br. at 10-11. To his credit, he 
9 
acknowledges that the Board's rationale sheets have already been found to 
satisfy constitutional requirements. Id. at 10; Padilla, 947 P.2d at 669-70 
("[R]ationale sheets used by the Board ... were adequate and did not deprive 
[the defendant] of due process."). And he does not dispute the fact that he 
received a rationale sheet explaining the Board's decision. R. 151. 
Accordingly, the Board provided Mr. Harmon a constitutionally adequate 
rationale for its decision as a matter of law. 
Nonetheless, he suggests that Padilla is old and much has changed. 
Aplt. Br. at 10. But that provides no basis for this Court to deviate from 
binding precedent. Mr. Harmon's real complaint seems to be that the Board's 
rationale sheet did not check off all of the mitigating factors he thinks apply. 
Aplt. Br. at 10-11. The Court, however, can only review the "fairness of 
process" in the Board's decision, not the "substance." Padilla, 947 P.2d at 
667; see also Renn, 904 P .2d at 684 ("[T]he substance of the Board's decision 
is not reviewable by an extraordinary writ except perhaps in an extreme 
case."). Accordingly, the Court has previously held that it will not review 
arguments about the rationale sheet factors the Board considered because 
they go to the substance of the Board's decision, not the procedural fairness. 
Stack v. State Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2001 UT App 280. That precedent 
means Mr. Harmon's allegations do not state a claim as a matter of law and 
were properly dismissed by the district court. 
10 
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Further, even if the court could examine the substance of the rationale 
sheet, the Board's marks, or absence thereof, were in no way arbitrary or 
unfair. Although Mr. Harmon argues that he qualified for several unchecked 
mitigating factors, Aplt's Br. at 10, he fails to acknowledge other aggravating 
factors the Board could have but did not mark (e.g., "Use of weapons or 
dangerous instrumentalities"). R. 151. The Board therefore did not, as Mr. 
Harmon suggests, merely exclude mitigating factors that might favor Mr. 
Harmon, but also excluded one or more aggravating factors that disfavor him. 
Moreover, the premise of Mr. Harmon's argument is unfounded. It's 
wrong to presume-as Mr. Harmon's argument necessarily does-that the 
Board's discretion whether to parole someone is simply a matter of 
determining whether there are more mitigating than aggravating factors. In 
reality, different factors (aggravating and mitigating) will matter more than 
others in general, and various factors may weigh more in specific cases. For 
example, the Board placed particular emphasis on Mr. Harmon's 
minimization of his actions as opposed to completely accepting responsibility. 
R. 151. 
The rationale sheet reflects a fair and calculated decision in which the 
Board marked the factors that were most influential in its decision-making 
process. Mr. Harmon has no viable due process claim that the Board's 
decision was procedurally or substantively unfair. 
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B. Mr. Harmon has no right to counsel nor a right to be 
advised of his ability to obtain his own counsel at a parole 
hearing. 
Mr. Harmon also argues the Board violated his due process rights by 
failing to "advise" him of "his right to seek private counsel." Aplt's Br. at 11-
12. But he fails to point to any authority that requires the Board to do so. 
Instead, he relies upon Neel v. Holden and the Sixth Amendment for 
support-neither of which suport his assertion. 
In Neel v. Holden, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that "there is no 
constitutional right to counsel in" a parole revocation hearing. 886 P .2d 
1097, 1104 (Utah 1994). Nowhere in the Neel opinion does the Court suggest 
the existence of a right to be advised of the ability to seek counsel in any 
parole hearing. Id. Notably, the Court refused to find "that Neel was denied 
due process by the Board's refusal to allow Neel's counsel to address the 
Board." Id. at 1103. If anything, Neel illustrates the court's unwillingness to 
find any ancillary right associated with counsel when an inmate has no 
constitutional or statutory right to counsel in the first place. 
Furthermore, analogous Utah case law contradicts Mr. Harmon's right-
to-be-advised argument. The Utah Supreme Court summarily rejected a 
similar argument that an inmate was not advised of his right to counsel at a 
parole revocation hearing. Folkes v. Turner, 449 P.2d 649, 649 (Utah 1969). 
The Court simply noted that the inmate "was not entitled" to counsel in the 
12 
first place. Id. Similarly, because Mr. Harmon is not entitled to counsel 
here, the Board had no due process duty to advise him that he could obtain 
his own counsel. 
Likewise, Mr. Harmon's reliance on the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution is misplaced. The Sixth Amendment does not 
grant a right to be advised of counsel at a Board hearing because it applies 
only to "criminal prosecutions." Neel, 886 P.2d at 1103; U.S. CONST. amend 
VI. And the Original Hearing was not a "criminal prosecution." See, e.g., 
Neel, 886 P.2d at 1103 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) 
("'the revocation of parole is not a part of the criminal prosecution and thus 
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not 
apply.")). 
In sum, the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Harmon's due 
process claims because, as a matter of law, they did not state actual due 
process violations. 
II. A Board Decision Cannot Be Arbitrary Or Capricious When It 
Falls Within The Indeterminate Sentencing Range . 
.JJ Lastly, Mr. Harmon claims that the Board acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when it determined Mr. Harmon would finish out his life 
sentence in prison. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. But, again, Utah law clearly 
contradicts his assertion. 
13 
Generally, the Board cannot abuse its discretion regarding parole 
decisions if the Board's decision falls within the indeterminate sentencing 
range imposed by the trial judge. Preece, 886 P.2d at 512 ("[S]o long as the 
period of incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons falls within an 
inmate's applicable indeterminate range, e.g. five years to life, then that 
decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and 
capricious."); see also McCammon v. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2016 UT App 
119, ,r 4, 378 P.3d 106 (quoting Padilla, 947 P.2d at 669) ("In setting or 
denying parole, 'the Board merely exercises its constitutional authority to 
commute or terminate an indeterminate sentence that, but for the Board's 
discretion, would run until the maximum period is reached."')). 
Mr. Harmon's petition stated that he "is currently serving a 5-to-life 
sentence for Murder." R. 2. The petition also states that the Board decided 
on the "maximum period" of Mr. Harmon's indeterminate sentence-life 
sentence. R. 4. Because the Board's decision "falls within [Mr. Harmon's] 
applicable indeterminate range," the Board's decision cannot be arbitrary or 
capricious. Preece, 886 P .2d at 512. Thus, the district court did not err in 
dismissing the petition. 
Although not argued in his brief, Mr. Harmon might be suggesting that 
his case satisfies the "unusual circumstances" exception mentioned in Preece. 
By listing Mr. Harmon's completion of training, rehabilitation and 
14 
educational programs, his employment within the prison, and a letter from 
Sherriff Phillips urging the Board to grant a parole hearing, Mr. Harmon 
may be trying to suggest that his status as a "model inmate" creates an 
"unusual circumstance" baring the Board from letting him serve the 
maximum period within his indeterminate range. Aplt. Br. at 8 and 
attachments to brief. However, the Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected 
this identical argument. In Padilla, an inmate argued his situation 
constituted "unusual circumstances" because both "the rationale sheets used 
by the Board were insufficient" and the inmate "ha[d] been an 'exemplary 
inmate' since his incarceration." Padilla, 947 P.2d at 671. The Utah Supreme 
Court dismissed the inmate's claims stating that "these do not constitute 
sufficiently unusual circumstances to justify review of the Board's 
substantive decision." Id. Mr. Harmon's implied argument mirrors Padilla 
and must also be rejected. 
Moreover, Mr. Harmon has no constitutional right to parole. It is well 
established that parole "is a privilege, an act of grace, as distinguished from a 
right," and therefore no constitutional protection applies to an inmate's 
expectation of parole. Ward v. Smith, 573 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1978). Here, 
Mr. Harmon never had a right to parole, and any expectation he had thereof 
was contrary to law. 
15 
The district court did not err in its dismissal because the Board's 
decision fell within the indeterminate sentencing range, no unusual 
circumstances existed, and Mr. Harmon had no right to parole. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's 
decision granting the Board's motion and dismissing Mr. Harmon's Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
s/ Stanford Purser 
Stanford E. Purser (13440) 
Deputy Solicitor General 
Sean D. Reyes (7969) 
Utah Attorney General 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
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